Evan Thompson, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto Evan Thompson (Toronto)
Vincent Abruzzo (Georgia State)
Joe Harper (NYU)
Gabrielle Jackson (Harvard)
Kevin Lande (Brandeis)
Earl K. Miller, Ph.D.
Picower Professor of Neuroscience
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ken Marable (Michigan State)
Recent fMRI studies indicate the ability in some persistent vegetative state and minimally conscious patients to direct their neurological activity through visualization tasks. One particular study had the patient perform either motor visualization or spatial visualization in answer a series of yes-no questions. I will examine the results of this study to determine whether consciousness may be present. I will use the Higher-Order Theory of consciousness from Peter Carruthers given its place as a very minimalistic view of consciousness.
Elisa Ruhl Rapaport (SUNY Buffalo)
Gaura Rader (U Florida)
This paper looks at Jerry Fodor's argument from his paper "Special Sciences" where he argues that reductionism is not necessary for the unity of science or token physicalism. I argue that Fodor is mistaken and that his attempt at providing a justification for the unity of science that doesn't make use of any type of reductionistic claim is circular and that the unity of science does require some form of reductionism.